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Abstract 
Throughout the relevant literatures American imagery of China has been consistently 
misrepresented and underestimated. Specifically, that imagery has been 
predominantly conceived in relatively superficial terms, as overtly positive or 
negative attitudes and opinions vulnerable to shifts at given moments. The 
significance of that imagery to US China policy has also been largely ignored. The aim 
of this paper is to re-evaluate American images of China so that they may be 
acknowledged as inextricable from discourse and identity processes and with the 
capacity to endure across extended periods of time. Further, it is to demonstrate that 
those images have always been actively complicit within the enactment and 
justification of US China policy.  To achieve this joint aim three historical moments in 
Sino-US relations are examined. During each of these moments it is shown that the 
particular image of ‘Uncivilised China’ has remained especially prominent within 
American imaginations, ultimately proving central to policy making decisions in 
Washington.   
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Introduction   
Populous, wealthy and powerful, the United States and China today represent two of the 
most influential actors in global affairs. The academic literature on Sino-American relations is 
enormous and expanding but the focal concern of this article is for the branch of that 
literature which concerns itself primarily with historical and contemporary American imagery 
of China and its people. Authors here have been responsible for the most valuable and 
sophisticated expositions of that imagery across the lifespan of Sino-US relations. However, 
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images, to varying extents, have been both misrepresented and underestimated in at least 
two especially pertinent ways. 
 
First, their constitution has regularly been left undetermined, as perhaps best illustrated by 
the co-editor of one volume who professed the desire not to become distracted by the 
‘science of imagery’ (Conroy, 1991: 13). In the absence of formal explications as to exactly 
what those images are, they have been conceived primarily, or even solely, as isolated 
interpretations of actions or behaviour. As a result, analyses have been restricted to 
assessments of their relative positivity or negativity at given moments. According to 
Hongshan Li, for example, ‘drastic turns in US-China relations have always corresponded 
with changes of national images and perceptions’ (Li, 1998: 2). In the introduction to Akira 
Iriye’s Across the Pacific, John King Fairbank observes that the book ‘describes the major 
phases and incidents of American relations with China and Japan...[and] the successive 
images that these three people have had of one another’ (Fairbank, 1967: vii, emphasis 
added). At least three authors have proposed distinct ‘periods’ or ‘eras’ of American imagery 
of China framed around selected events and/or policies (Isaacs, 1972: 71; Cohen, 1973: 55; 
Mosher, 1990: 21).  
 
Certainly, American images of that country have shifted quickly and dramatically at 
numerable historical moments but such a restrictive framework of understanding 
constitutes a flawed ontology. As the historian A.T. Steele explains, ‘Americans have tended 
to react intensely and emotionally to developments in China, with sudden fluctuations of 
feeling...This highly emotional element complicates the analyst’s task’. He concludes: ‘The 
ups and downs of public opinion on China become understandable only against the historical 
background and the heritage of assumptions, expectations, emotions, traditions and even 
illusions and legends which have contributed to our present attitudes’ (Steele, 1966: 1, 
emphasis added). While American imagery of China, therefore, can represent emotive and 
comparatively superficial reactions to, or interpretations of, the happenings of particular 
moments, they are also established assumptions which remain stable and enduring across 
those moments. In short, American imagery of China should be analysed not merely as ideas 
about what China and the Chinese do, but additionally as understandings about who China 
and the Chinese are.  
 
This is a simple but crucial observation, for reasons best described by way of an example. 
During the Second World War China had been a valuable ally of the United States in its 
protracted conflict with Japan and popular American attitudes of that country and its people 
had become ostensibly positive. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949 and its entry into the Korean War in 1950 just as Western concerns of a global, 
‘monolithic’ communist threat had begun to pervade American society, however, ensured a 
rapid and dramatic shift in opinion. Popular American imagery of China became significantly 
more negative and so, in this sense, what China and the Chinese ‘did’ is certainly a legitimate 
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basis for the investigation. However, and as we will see, powerful American images of China 
and its people both immediately before and after that brief period shared many 
commonalities with those found in the years, decades and even centuries which preceded it.  
 
Second, contributors to the literature have traditionally concerned themselves little with the 
significance of American imagery of China to US China policy. Principally, this is because the 
majority of its authors have not been active within the discipline of International Relations 
(IR). As such, this may initially appear a misplaced criticism. However, throughout that 
literature it has been repeatedly stated that those images are in fact complicit within the 
enactment of policy. Li, for example, notes that ‘image and perception have always been 
essential in the making of US-China relations’ (Li, 1998: 2). Harold Isaacs similarly suggested 
that ‘images, feelings, prejudices, and personality factors…get somehow cranked into the 
process of policy making’ (Isaacs, 1972: 64). Steele asserted that ‘United States policy toward 
China is a product of the interplay between the administration, the Congress, public opinion 
and various pressure groups’ (Steele, 1967: 205). None, however, provided any meaningful 
qualification in support of their observations and by failing to elaborate upon the 
functionality of this ‘interplay’ each remained apparently insensitive to the nature and 
structure of the relationship.  
 
These silences of the literature are those to which this paper is designed to speak. It begins 
with an explication of the constitution of American images of China. It then describes how, 
as inextricable from the concepts of discourse and identity, those images must be 
acknowledged not merely as isolated interpretations of actions or behaviour at particular 
moments but additionally as more stable understandings and assumptions with the 
potential to endure over time. To more forcefully articulate the broadly unsubstantiated 
claims of such authors as those noted above, it then describes how that imagery is 
unavoidably complicit within both the enactment and justification of American foreign policy 
towards China. The latter half of the paper is devoted to an examination of three pertinent 
historical moments in Sino-US relations. The intention is firstly to show how particularly 
powerful American discourse and imagery of what I refer to as ‘Uncivilised China’ emerged 
in the early nineteenth century and remained relatively stable for centuries, into the modern 
period. It is also to demonstrate the ability of that particular discourse and imagery to create 
the necessary realities within certain courses of American policy towards Uncivilised China 
could not only be enabled but also legitimised as appropriate and justifiable.           
 
 
Discourse and identity: The constitution of American imagery of China  
Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’. Discourse can 
refer to any statement which entails meaning but equally to a grouping of statements into a 
recognisable category, such as that of IR (Foucault, 1972: 80). Importantly, discourse 
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provides subjective interpretations and realities of the world around us, a point reinforced 
by Howarth and Stavrakakis. They argue that a forest in the path of a proposed new road can 
represent an inconvenient barrier, a site of scientific interest and/or a symbol of national 
heritage (Howarth et al, 2000: 3). Imagery, or representation, then, is the discursive 
construction of reality as the world itself is unintelligible until ascribed meaning through 
discourse.  
 
While discourse constructs the reality of an otherwise indecipherable world, so too does it 
work to construct the identities of which that reality is constitutive. As Osborne and Wintle 
observe, ‘identity is always socially mediated and...wholly or partially the precipitate of 
social discourses...’ (Osborne and Wintle, 2006: 16). As discursive constructions of reality, 
then, images are also the constructions of societal actors. Thus, while the economic and 
military capabilities of states are undoubtedly critical to the determination of international 
relations, those states are not given by nature or pre-discursive. Rather, as ‘imaginative 
geographies’ states (like forests) are socially constructed with inherently unstable identities 
(Said, 1995: 49). They exist as ideas as much as territorial physicalities ‘out there’ in the real 
world. American discourse of China therefore represents the articulation of ideas about that 
country in the broadest possible sense. It can be manifest as any number of disparate and 
single statements where China is the object, but equally to collectives of related statements 
about it. Further, American images, or representations, of China are discursive constructions 
of its reality.  
 
The identity of any state, however, cannot be conceived in the absence of understandings 
about opposing others. This is because meaning itself is created in discourse (Neumann, 
1999: 12 and 13). In Orientalism Edward Said famously argued that ‘the Orient has helped to 
define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience’. 
Importantly, he asserted that the East has been consistently represented as fundamentally 
inferior in relation to the necessarily superior West (Said, 1995: 1-2). In Imperial Encounters 
Roxanne Lynn Doty similarly investigated the identity processes which have enabled such 
binary oppositions as ‘“developed/underdeveloped”, “first world/third world”, *and+ 
core/periphery”’, among others, in which the West has perpetually occupied the former, 
superior locations (Doty, 1998: 6). As Michael Shapiro argues, the process of making others 
foreign almost invariably ensures their status as less-than-equal subjects (Shapiro, 1988: 
100). 
 
The analyses of Said and Doty, to varying extents, both rely upon the contributions of 
Foucault. Crucially, Foucault not only argued that discourse is responsible for the 
construction of our social realities, but that it is neither free nor unrestricted. Discourse, he 
observed, is tightly contained; ‘controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to 
a certain number of procedures’. As such, it is more than a simple set of coherent 
statements (Foucault, 1975: 215). It is the product of rules and regulations which promotes 
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particular ideas and suppresses others, keeping them from circulation. What emerges are 
‘regimes of truth’ which function within every society. A regime of truth represents a general 
politics of truth and regulates discourse so that one is able to distinguish between true and 
false statements (Foucault, 1980: 131). Walter Lippmann put it another way: ‘*I+n the great 
blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already 
defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form 
stereotyped for us by our culture’ (Lippman, 1922: 81).  
 
A regime of truth, then, simultaneously endorses certain ideas while rejecting others. The 
ideas of some people are accepted as true whereas those of others are marginalised, 
ignored or rejected. This naturalisation of ideas is critical to the formation of common sense 
assumptions which often go unquestioned because they are believed to represent truth and 
reality, becoming ‘implicit, backgrounded, taken for granted’ (Fairclough, 2001: 77). The 
understanding that social identities are beholden to regimes of truth and processes of 
naturalisation is advanced by both Said and Doty. Each traces Western historical 
constructions of non-Western peoples and places and, as already described, the stability of 
particular binary oppositions through which those constructions have long been articulated.  
 
From these assumptions, it is a fundamental assertion of this paper that American discourse 
has always been responsible for the construction of images (and hence the reality) of China 
and the Chinese within American imaginations. Moreover, China’s identity has traditionally 
been constructed as an (often inferior) other in relation to the necessarily superior United 
States, according to the restrictions imposed by a powerful regime of truth. This regime of 
truth has ensured that certain representations of China have endured at the expense of 
others, becoming accepted, common sense understandings which have remained stable 
over extended periods of time. These understandings, or identity constructions, have also 
always been inextricable from the enactment of US China policy. It is this understanding to 
which the paper now turns.      
 
 
Imagery and foreign policy  
As established earlier, authors throughout the imagery literature have previously failed to 
satisfactorily explicate the salience of American images of China to US China policy, despite 
emphasising on several occasions a presumed functionality of the former within the latter. In 
the IR literature too we find a general paucity of analysis as to their relationship. In 1970 
Robert Jervis noted that while the military and economic relations of states have been 
exhaustively studied, images in international affairs have long been neglected (Jervis, 1976: 
3-4). Robert Keohane later famously dismissed the utility of ‘reflectivist’ (in contrast to 
‘rationalist’) approaches to IR because of their rejection of testable theory. He warned that, 
in consequence, reflectivist literatures would continue to remain on the periphery of the 
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discipline (Keohane, 1988: 392). ‘Issues of war and peace’, argues Stephen Walt, ‘are too 
important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is 
divorced from the real world’ (Walt, 1991: 223).   
 
Traditionally, foreign policy analysis has reflected the tendency of the dominant realist and 
liberal schools to ignore the significance of discourse and imagery to the advancement of 
policy and to focus instead upon material forces. In consequence, the role of ideas within the 
formation and enactment of policy has been broadly overlooked. Moreover, the foreign 
policy of states has been understood to constitute the manifestation of those material forces 
as the objective behaviour of singular, isolated units of analysis. In the particular case of 
China, for example, Thomas J. Christensen argues that contemporary debates are centred on 
distributions of material power. ‘Power is what matters’, he argues, ‘and what matters in 
power is one’s relative capabilities compared with those of others, especially other great 
powers’ (Christensen, 2001: 6). In 1989, however, James Rosenau argued that ‘the 
breakdown of the old interstate system is necessitating reformulation of [the ways in which] 
domestic and international processes sustain each other’ (Rosenau, 1989: 5). Peter 
Gourevitch similarly suggested that the domestic and international realms should be 
examined holistically, since traditional distinctions between established levels no longer 
reflect reality (Gourevitch, 1978). 
 
David Campbell provides a useful reorientation of traditional assumptions of foreign policy 
so that analysis shifts from a concern for the relations between states to one for the 
processes by which states are made foreign in relation to one another. Societal 
representations of foreign lands and people, he argues, are more than descriptions of others 
‘out there’. They constitute the discursive construction of states at all levels of society and 
the ubiquitous process by which actors are made foreign in relation to the identity of the 
self. When understood in these terms, processes of representation become a ‘specific sort of 
boundary producing political performance’ (Ashley, 1987, p.51, emphasis in original). The 
power inherent to domestic or societal discourse, then, is such that the truths it advances 
are able to create the necessary reality within which particular policies are not only enabled 
but justified as logical and proper courses of action. As Foucault explains, power is 
understood to be inextricable from knowledge so that one cannot be advanced in the 
absence of the other (Foucault, 1980: 52). The result is a power/knowledge nexus which 
precludes the advancement of discourse and the establishment of truth as neutral or 
dispassionate endeavours (Foucault, 1979).  
 
Discursive representation, then, is unavoidably performative in the sense that ‘it produces 
the effects that it names’ (Gregory, 1995: 18). Ellingson agrees, noting that the historical 
construction of non-Europeans as ‘lower’ peoples has been at the heart of the establishment 
of a global European hegemony (Ellingson, 2001: xiii). International relations therefore 
represent an arena of power that is both political and discursive, wherein discourses create 
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certain possibilities and preclude others (Apple, 2003, p.6). This means that American 
discourses and imagery about China have never been produced objectively or in the absence 
of purpose and intent. Their dissemination must always be acknowledged as a performance 
of power, however seemingly innocent or benign. They are able to create the imagined 
conditions within which appropriate, and perhaps even ostensibly unsavoury, action can be 
enacted while other potential policies are dismissed as inappropriate or impossible. As Doty 
confirms, ‘the naturalization of meaning has had consequences ranging from the 
appropriation of land, labor and recourses to the subjugation and extermination of entire 
groups of people’ (Doty, 1998: 7).  
 
 
The intention of this paper is not to dismiss entirely the utility of the ‘traditional’ approaches 
to International Relations. Yet, China and the United States share a history of alliance and 
war, trust and suspicion, sympathy and hatred and their relations should not be conveniently 
reduced to overtly materialistic analyses of policy, merely of what happened. It is necessary 
to achieve a complementary understanding of how it was able to happen. To return to the 
example provided by Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 3), then, the forest could be 
destroyed, left in tact or even protected but each policy would always be fundamentally 
reliant upon which of its potential representations is considered true by those responsible 
for its future. In such a way, American discourse and imagery of China are not merely related 
to, or somehow affective towards, the enactment of US China policy (as authors within the 
imagery literature have variously suggested). They are in fact inextricable from, and 
constitutive of, that policy so that they can never accurately be conceived as separate or 
distinct. Rather, they must consequently be understood as actively complicit at every stage 
of its formulation, enactment and justification.  
 
So far this paper has established three important points. First, American images of China 
have been fundamentally misrepresented throughout the literature. Specifically, they have 
been conceived primarily, or even solely, as isolated interpretations of actions or behaviour 
at given moments and not additionally acknowledged as potentially more stable and 
enduring understandings and assumptions. Second, American discourse has always been 
responsible for constructing the identities of China in relation to that of the United States. 
That discourse, moreover, has been beholden to a regime of truth which has ensured that 
particular images or truths about China have become naturalised and common sense with 
the capacity to endure across extended periods of time. Third, American discourses and 
imagery of China are inextricable from US China policy when that policy is acknowledged as 
the ubiquitous process by which the American self is distinguished from the Chinese other. 
Accordingly, representational processes have always been actively complicit within both its 
enactment and justification.   
 
To demonstrate the potential utility of the above retheorisation of American imagery of 
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China, this paper turns now to examine three particular historical moments of Sino-US 
relations. The intention is to show that, despite American attitudes and opinion shifting both 
quickly and significantly at each of these moments, particular images of China exhibited 
powerful and enduring commonalities and continuities previously neglected throughout the 
wider literature. China has always existed in numerable and contrasting forms, from a threat 
to an economic opportunity to a land of mystery and exoticism. Especially powerful and 
stable images of what I refer to as ‘Uncivilised China’, however, are isolated for examination 
here. Further, and in order to confront the argument that imagery is fundamentally 
‘divorced from the real world’, the intention is also to demonstrate how images of 
Uncivilised China have always been inextricable from US China policy. It is demonstrated that 
those images have repeatedly created the necessary realities within which actions by 
Washington could be legitimised as appropriate action and in which alternative policies 
could be simultaneously disregarded as no alternative at all.   
 
 
Historical and contemporary American images of China   
Early American images: The establishment of Uncivilised China 
In 1784 Americans first established trade relations with China when the ship the Empress of 
China sailed from New York to Canton. Thereafter, popular imagery of China and its people 
initially constructed them in largely favourable terms, as its ancient and exotic culture was 
heavily romanticised. Soon, however, they became the objects of overtly derogatory and 
racist sentiment. For centuries the Chinese had operated a tribute system of commerce 
which Westerners deemed archaic and corrupt. Foreigners were subject to unfamiliar 
regulations and restricted to the port city of Canton. Complaints arose quickly among 
Americans and in 1791 Vice-Consul to Canton Thomas Randall observed that ‘the Chinese 
are considered by most persons who have seen them, as very contemptible, however 
importantly they think of themselves...’ (Syrett and Cooke, 1965: 50). In 1816 one 
contributor to the Country Courier declared the Chinese ‘tricksters’, ‘the most pusillanimous 
people on Earth’ and ‘the greatest rogues in nature’ (Country Courier, 22 August, 1816).  
 
American missionary interest in China similarly emerged early in the nineteenth century. In 
1830 American reverends David Abeel and Elijah Bridgeman arrived in Canton with 
instructions to export Christianity to China. Upon his return, Abeel wrote,  
with all her empty boasts of perfection…there is probably no other space on Earth so filled with 
real wretchedness as China. From the “Dragon Throne”, to the lowest menial in authority…her 
plebian [sic] happiness is the combined result of poverty, virtual slavery and vice (Abeel, 1836: 
141). 
Even before his arrival in China the Religious Monitor and Evangelical Repository had 
complained that ‘there seems to be more obstacles to the introduction of Christianity into 
China than into any other place. The idolatry and superstition of that country are of the 
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grossest kind’ (Religious Monitor and Evangelical Repository, Sept, 1826). Certainly, such 
discourses were not those alone which represented China for Americans. China and the 
Chinese continued to be romanticised and imagined as a potentially lucrative source of 
income, but American discourse worked to construct the almost antithetical identity of 
Uncivilised China. Ultimately, this particular construction established a comparatively 
dominant position within American imaginations for much of the nineteenth century, as it 
became increasingly naturalised and pervasive common sense.  
 
Uncivilised China was constructed in relation to the Enlightenment ideals of the United 
States; of John Winthrop’s ‘city upon a hill’ or Thomas Jefferson’s ‘empire for liberty’. China 
was understood to be self-evidently removed from the United States. Yet, it was also 
expected that China should aspire to American standards of civilisation. The United States 
had been founded in reaction to the nature and practises of the Old World of Europe and so 
its fabled ‘exceptionalism’ was grounded upon active progression. In his revolutionary 1776 
pamphlet Common Sense, for example, Thomas Paine had argued that ‘the cause of America 
is in a great measure the cause of all mankind’ (Paine, 1995: 5).  
 
Uncivilised China, then, inevitably came to occupy the negative location within a powerful 
‘civilised/uncivilised’ binary. As archaic, despotic and heathen, for some China represented 
everything against which the United States was and its imagined existence says as much 
about the identity of the United States as it does about China. American discourse of China 
around this time was not uniformly derogatory and discursive resistance was advanced. 
However, even when attempts were made to praise the Chinese negative imagery would 
often inadvertently be reinforced. In 1818, for example, the Weekly Visitor sought to 
challenge prevailing wisdom: ‘About three years ago, at a public dinner…the conversation 
turned on the dishonesty and immorality of the Chinese’, the Visitor wrote, before 
describing the story told by a Mr John Locke. A Chinese merchant, Sha-King-Qua, heard of 
the death of a bankrupt English acquaintance and in sympathy sent money to the man’s 
children. According to the Visitor Mr Locke ‘was so much affected *by the story+, that his 
eyes filled and his voice thickened’ (Weekly Visitor and Ladies Museum, 27 June, 1818). The 
altruism of Sha-King-Qua is therefore applauded but he is simultaneously confirmed as the 
exception which proves the rule; as a ‘Chinaman’ of good character his good deed is worth 
recalling and the ‘dishonesty and immorality’ of the Chinese is confirmed.  
 
The frustrations of traders in particular would eventually facilitate military conflict with 
China. Westerners illegally imported opium into the country and in March 1839 all 
shipments of the drug in Canton were confiscated. As the first of two so-called opium wars 
broke out the United States remained officially neutral. However, American merchants 
supported British efforts to remove the barriers which kept them from China’s markets. A 
petition to Congress in May 1839, for example, noted that if the British decided to blockade 
China’s ports, ‘a perseverance in these measures...*would+ reduce the Chinese government 
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to a willingness to listen to all the just and reasonable demands of the foreign power’. The 
United States should, it concluded, ‘act in concert...to establish commercial relations with 
this empire upon a safe and honourable footing, such as exists between all friendly powers’ 
(US House of Representatives, 1839: 207).  
 
‘Just and reasonable demands’ are those made by law-abiding, civilised nations which 
sought commercial relations based upon ‘a safe and honourable footing’. Americans could 
therefore legitimately side with their Enlightened European cousins against necessarily 
inferior Uncivilised China. The war ended in 1842 with total defeat for the Chinese, an 
outcome which only confirmed their uncivilised, inferior status (Miller, 1969: 112). In 1856 
the second opium war broke out. The bombardment of Canton began in October and the 
American press were either supportive or least sanguine about the action taken, which also 
involved American troops. ‘We are in for the war’, the New York Herald proclaimed, ‘and 
God be thankful for it!’ (New York Herald, 21 January, 1857). Once more, China lacked the 
standards of modernity boasted by the West and images of that country and its people 
provided discursive constructions of a reality within which the identity of Uncivilised China 
had become a naturalised truth. In such a way, military action for the purpose of civilising 
China could be deemed unproblematic.  
 
 
Early twentieth century images: China’s revolutionary era 
Between 1898 and 1901 the so-called Boxer Rebellion erupted in China. The Boxers believed 
that foreigners enjoyed a privileged position within their territory but the resulting unrest 
was quashed by Western troops. According to Rey Chow, a ‘King Kong syndrome’ emerges 
whenever Westerners, gripped by a foreign (‘Third World’) spectacle, ‘become repelled by 
what is happening “over there”’ (Chow, 1991: 84). Such a response was exhibited by the 
American press throughout the Boxer Rebellion. The New York Times, for example, reported 
that ‘an army of civilization’ had arrived in China to pacify the unrest (New York Times, 20 
June, 1900). The Chicago Daily Tribune argued that China had to be ‘rescued from herself by 
the powers’ (Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 July, 1900). Ultimately, the United States committed 
2,500 troops to aid those ‘civilised’ nations with which it shared a Western bond, a 
communion which accentuated the differences between the West and non-West (Doty, 
1998: 33-36).  
 
The rebellion left little hope for the ruling Qing dynasty and from October 1911 
revolutionary fervour gripped China. Numerable provincial assemblies quickly declared their 
independence and in February the following year Emperor Puyi abdicated. The Republic of 
China had already been established with Sun Yat-sen its provisional president but the 
American press were initially dubious as to the ability of the Chinese to establish a Western-
style polity. ‘The Chinese are industrious, apt, dextrous, and accustomed to frugal life’, the 
Los Angeles Times proclaimed, ‘but they do not possess a single element of character out of 
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which republican citizenship can be manufactured’ (Los Angeles Times, 27 April, 1912). The 
Chicago Daily Tribune informed its readers that the Chinese were ‘dumb to progress’ 
(Chicago Daily Tribune, 14 February, 1912).  
 
Some applauded the ‘reformers’: ‘The sympathies of Americans are naturally with the 
movement toward a republican form of government’, noted the Washington Post 
(Washington Post, 8 November, 1911). Indeed, Sun’s aspirations attracted renewed 
American hope for China and in some respects were suggestive of an emerging ‘age of 
admiration’ (Isaacs, 1972: 71). The New York Times asserted that, ‘for the past decade there 
have been many capable and high-minded men among the reformers...there is good to 
reason to think that they will be able to guide the nation with a fair degree of safety’ (New 
York Times, 31 October, 1911). Disparities in opinion are unremarkable, even predictable, 
but what underpinned the arguments of both sides were naturalised understandings that 
inferior, Uncivilised China had to change; there was no acceptable alternative. ‘Whatever 
injustices may be committed in the course of the modernization of China’, the Times has 
earlier asserted, ‘will evidently be lesser evils than the continuance of unmodernized China’ 
(New York Times, 20 June, 1900).  
 
The United States had been born from revolution, the rhetoric of which, as we have seen, 
supported freedom for all people, even those beyond American shores. Sun, ‘China’s George 
Washington’, appeared intent on building a modern republic (Sharman, 1934: vi). Yet, 
Americans judged consequent revolutions by the ‘exemplary’ model of their own; John 
Adams declared theirs ‘the grandest revolution that has ever taken place in the world’ 
(Adams, 1852: 470). Thus, while enthusiasm for helping the Chinese had certainly increased 
it was a response grounded primarily upon enduring assumptions about China’s identity. In 
other words, this new ‘era of paternalism’ saw a lessening of hostility towards the Chinese 
but American expectations were still that Uncivilised China had to conform to superior 
Western ideals; there was no acceptable or conceivable alternative (Cohen, 1978: 55).    
 
That China’s revolution would be assessed against the paragon of US republicanism was 
illustrated perfectly by the Washington Post:   
To say their government is a republic does not prove it to be so. The way to prove it is for all 
the women to wear high-heeled boots, girdle corsets, hobble skirts, and basket hats and for 
the male sex to come over to this country and patronize American tailors. Then, and only then, 
will we be convinced that China really has a republican form of government (Washington Post, 
17 March, 1912).  
It was understood that China had yet to attain the civilised standards of Western nation-
states and so while imagery briefly became ostensibly more positive the Chinese were still 
classified as a fundamentally inferior, uncivilised nation and people. The limitations of 
conceiving of imagery as primarily beholden to events and actions are hence reaffirmed by 
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the fact that, despite the advancement of overtly positive responses to this temporarily 
specific moment, powerful underlying assumptions of identity informed Americans that in 
1912, as throughout much of the nineteenth century, China remained a lesser and unequal 
partner. To a significant extent, American imagery of the Chinese remained largely 
consistent durable and Washington’s hesitancy in awarding diplomatic recognition was 
justified accordingly.  
 
On 20 July a memorandum from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs enquired as to ‘whether 
the present Chinese Government may not be regarded as so far substantially conforming to 
the accepted standards of international law as to merit formal recognition?’ Two months 
later, Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson declared:  
...it would be more in accordance with established precedents to defer recognition of the 
Chinese Republic until a permanent constitution shall have been definitely adopted by a 
representative national assembly, a president duly elected in accordance with the provisions of 
such constitution, and the present Provisional Government replaced by a permanent one with 
constitutional authority (Department of State, n.d.: 81 and p.86). 
China, then, remained an uncivilised outsider, devoid of such hallmarks of civilisation as a 
‘president’, a ‘permanent constitution’ and a ‘representative national assembly’. The 
prerequisites for acknowledgement were of Western design as its own standard of 
government had first to be in place. The Chinese recognised this and on the day of his 
nation’s formal inauguration Sun Yat-sen said: ‘with the establishment of the provisional 
government we will try our best to carry out the duties of a civilised nation so as to obtain 
the rights of a civilised state’ (Cohen, 1972: 244).  
 
Recognition was formally awarded in May 1913 by the new American president Woodrow 
Wilson. However, to many Americans ‘the China mess was incomprehensible and hopeless’ 
(Thomson, Stanley and Perry, 1981: 162). In 1923 Secretary of State Charles Hughes argued 
that China had ‘failed to provide a government which could...discharge her international 
obligations’ (cited in Hibbert, 1964: 284). As late as 1928 his successor Frank Kellogg 
declared:  
The United States is not concerned with the type of government set up in China. It cares only 
that conditions shall be created permitting the citizens of China to achieve their own highest 
welfare and engage freely with citizens of the United States in such relations as shall be 
mutually desired and profitable...(Quoted in Quigley, 1929: 473).   
Thus, the United States, in fact, was very concerned with the type of government which 
might be established in China. As ever, it was one which had to conform to American 
standards of civilisation. 
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Late twentieth century images of China: The 1989 Chinese protest movement 
The 1980s represented ‘golden years’ in Sino-US relations as prevailing American imagery of 
China became increasingly complimentary (Kennedy, 2003: 51). On 1 January 1979 the 
Carter administration had established full diplomatic ties with Beijing for the first time in 
three decades. The new leader of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, became the latest Chinese 
moderniser to be lauded throughout the United States. In the same year he toured the 
country, a trip which served only to increase his popularity among Americans. Even 
previously divisive issues like human rights were overlooked as damning reports ‘fell dead 
off the presses’. The societal regulation of discourse was such that publications critical of 
China’s human rights record had little impact on an American public disinclined to afford 
them attention (Mosher, 1990: 195). American imagery had entered another period of 
renewed positivity. As it had during China’s revolutionary period of the early twentieth 
century the country had a leader Americans admired and a plan for reform which seemed to 
have been inspired by the superior American model. Yet, this positivity had once more 
emerged as a result of identity construction processes as expectations for China remained 
wedded to the values of the United States itself.   
 
After the death of the popular statesman Hu Yaobang in April 1989 widespread protests 
erupted across China which lasted for several weeks. Their participants were socially 
heterogeneous and the movement was nationwide but the attention of the Western media 
inevitably fell upon Beijing. The Tiananmen Square protests were relatively peaceful until 
government troops were ordered to restore control and in the early hours of 4 June the 
movement was broken up by force. The Chinese government claimed that three hundred 
people were killed, with another seven thousand injured. These figures, however, are heavily 
disputed and may have been much higher. An Amnesty International Report, for example, 
suggests that at least 1,000 people had been killed. The cover of Time magazine declared 
simply ‘massacre in Beijing’ (Time, 12 June, 1989). The New York Times reported, ‘Crackdown 
in Beijing; Troops attack and crush Beijing Protest; Thousands fight back, scores are killed’ 
(New York Times, 4 June, 1989). Unlike in the past, the Chinese were no longer so brazenly 
identified as uncivilised or inferior but that imagery can prove both stable and enduring and 
that Uncivilised China remained a powerful, naturalised construction was firmly evidenced 
by the events of 1989 and American reactions towards it.  
 
The events in Tiananmen, observes Richard Madsen, caused revulsion for Americans not 
only because of the deaths that occurred, but because the episode did not end as they had 
hoped (Madsen, 1998: ch.1). Illusions of an impending ‘free China’ had appeared but the 
American understanding of freedom, of the mutually-reinforcing liberalisation of the 
economic and political, was not shared by the Chinese protesters (Madsen, 1998: ch.5). 
Indeed, some confessed not to even know exactly what they wanted (Madsen, 1998: 17). 
The demands for political reform were particularly misrepresented since the protesters’ 
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understanding of democracy diverged significantly from those of Americans. The majority of 
student participants were demanding an end to corruption and economic inequality rather 
than the establishment of Western-style democratic elections.  
 
The movement, then, was interpreted through the values of American identity so that 
discourse remained tightly controlled and regulated. Confirmation of China as an uncivilised 
other in relation to the superior and law-abiding West soon followed as Washington lobbied 
the world’s leading multilateral economic organisations for a withdrawal of support. 
Weapons sales to the PRC were banned and high level military exchanges were postponed. 
Another round of sanctions later followed in which lending to China by international 
financial institutions and official diplomatic exchanges both ceased. Sanctions against Beijing 
were legitimised on the basis that China had once again failed to conform to the superior 
standards of Western civilisation. As Suettinger puts it, the West ‘recoiled in horror and 
disgust, expelling it from the company of modern civilized nations’ (Suettinger, 2003: 1). 
 
In 1992 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell argued that America remained ‘a 
remarkable nation. We are, as Abraham Lincoln told Congress in December 1862, a nation 
that “cannot escape history” because we are “the last best hope of earth”’ (Powell, 1992: 
32). As the ‘last best hope’ the United States could still unproblematically occupy a location 
from which it claimed exceptionalism, through an identity based upon the values of 
democracy and liberty for all. The events in and around Tiananmen Square were framed 
accordingly and on 6 June 1989 President George Bush argued that  
the momentous, tragic events in China give us reason to redouble our efforts to continue the 
spread of freedom and democracy around the globe...to broaden the community of free 
nations, and to reaffirm the rights of man (Woolley and Peters, American Presidency Project 
[online]).   
 
Time informed its readers that by the morning of 4 June ‘the great, peaceful dream for 
democracy had become a horrible nightmare’ (Time, 12 June, 1989). However, that dream 
was American, not Chinese. Despite apparent signals from China that it was now following in 
the footsteps of the West yet another Chinese ‘revolution’ had failed to conform to 
American expectations. The imagined geography of Uncivilised China existed to Americans as 
starkly now as it had done a century earlier as it remained a nation and a people which 
lacked the imagined standards of the civilised Western world. It had taken just a few weeks 
for prevailing imagery of China to shift dramatically from overtly positive to negative but 
beneath that shift lay enduring and powerful continuities and commonalities. Harry Thayer, 
former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, articulated the situation perfectly: 
‘China was oversold in 1978-79, just as we had oversold Chiang Kai-shek in World War II…the 
Chinese turned out not to be saints and perfect partners after all. This is a long standing 
problem in the relationship’ (Tucker, 2001: 327-328).  
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Conclusion 
Warren Cohen is representative of much of the relevant literature when he describes the 
United States’ historical relations with China as ‘schizophrenic’, with ‘a pattern of alternating 
highs and lows’ (Cohen, 2010: 278 and 280). Indeed, throughout the body of comparable 
literature American images of China and the Chinese have been variously misrepresented 
and underestimated. Certainly, American images of China have shifted quickly and 
dramatically in terms of their relative positivity and negativity at given moments. However, 
this analysis shows that they have also endured as more powerful underlying assumptions 
about China’s identity across extended temporal periods. Specifically, it has argued that 
imagery should be acknowledged not only as representations of what the Chinese do, but 
additionally constitutive of enduring assumptions about who the Chinese are.  
 
To achieve this, a reinterpretation of imagery emphasised its inextricability from discourse 
and identity processes. American discourse is that which has always constructed images of 
China in particular ways, providing selected realities of that country and its people. 
Moreover, because the identities of others are always produced from understandings about 
the identity of the self, China has always been historically represented in relation to the 
United States. The paper has argued that the idea of Uncivilised China has remained an 
especially durable construction, produced in relation to the necessarily more civilised United 
States.  It has also shown that foreign policy must be understood not as the actions of pre-
discursive states but the continual process by which states are made foreign in relation to 
one another. In such a way, it has argued that American imagery of China represents an 
inextricable component of US China policy. That imagery, in fact, has always been actively 
complicit at every stage of its formulation, enactment and justification. 
 
During the earliest period of Sino-US relations American discourse worked to construct the 
identity of Uncivilised China as backward, heathen and anachronistic and as failing to adhere 
to Western standards of civilisation. Imagery of Uncivilised China became accepted and 
naturalised and endured for generations, throughout the Chinese revolutionary period in the 
early years of the twentieth century and during the 1989 protest movement and the events 
in Tiananmen Square (among innumerable others). Imagery at each of these particular 
moments can be logically analysed in isolation as dramatic shifts of attitude and opinion 
were undoubtedly in evidence. However, beneath these shifts lay more enduring 
assumptions of identity which remained highly durable and largely unchanged. Expectations 
of Uncivilised China have always been that it civilise to Western standards. As such, whether 
American imagery of that country has appeared more overtly positive or negative at any 
given moment is, to a certain extent, irrelevant. Further, at each of these moments 
comparatively stable understandings about Uncivilised China worked to legitimise actions in 
Washington. They created realities within which Uncivilised China had to change, and in 
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which certain political possibilities could be introduced at the expense of others. They 
allowed Americans to support the British-led opium wars of the mid-nineteenth century, 
delay recognition of the new Chinese government in 1912 and implement sanctions upon 
Beijing after the Tiananmen Square ‘massacre’ of 1989.    
 
China’s increasing involvement in contemporary global affairs means that Washington’s 
desire for Beijing to participate peacefully and cooperatively within the US-dominated 
system of global political and economic governance is more palpable today than ever. 
Powerful American images of China and the Chinese and the policies they will serve to 
enable and justify must accordingly become a focus of more concerted scholarly attention. It 
is imperative, in other words, that these ‘schizophrenic’ relations be acknowledged as at 
least partly contingent upon pervasive and durable imagistic foundations. Only in this way 
can the contours of the relationship between the United States and China be more 
satisfactorily understood so that historical episodes we wish not to be repeated might 
somehow be avoided in the future.      
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